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during bankruptcy and the exception to the rule. Part II discusses, in three separate sections, a 
creditor’s claim for breach of fiduciary duties, a claim for fraudulent transfer, and derivative 
standing.  
I. Causes of Action Brought During the Pendency of a Bankruptcy Case Belong to the 
Estate Unless Unique to an Individual Creditor 
 
 Causes of action that are generalized to all creditors cannot be brought by individual 
creditors as the claims belong to the debtor’s estate.  An estate is “all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”5 The interests of the debtor (and 
thus the estate) include any generalized causes of action.6  The causes of action belonging to the 
estate are not limited to those against the debtor: “Although the claims raised by [creditor] are 
not against the debtor but are against a third party, the same reasoning applies.”7 Whether a cause 
of action is defined as property belonging to the estate will be determined by state law, in the 
absence of conflict with federal law.8 It is therefore the trustee’s responsibility to bring causes of 
action that belong to a debtor’s estate, including those that are ancillary to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy but not specifically against the debtor.  
 Claims alleging fraud, such as alter ego claims, are general claims that only a trustee can 
bring. For example, in St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. the court found that PepsiCo’s 
allegations of alter ego illustrate injury generalized to all creditors of a debtor, and thus must be 
brought by the trustee.9 In this action, PepsiCo, Inc. (“PepsiCo”) filed a third-party complaint 
against Banner Industries, the parent company of Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. 
(“CL”).10 CL bought Lee Way Motor Fright, Inc. (“Lee Way”) from PepsiCo, with PepsiCo’s 
                                               
5 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
6 See Board of Tr. of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2002). 
7 St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989). 
8 See In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1989). 
9 884 F.2d at 703-05. 
10 Id. at 690. 
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guarantee on bonds issued to Lee Way still outstanding.11 Lee Way, now owned by CL, then sold 
assets to CL, leaving Lee Way without assets to pay off its debts.12 Lee Way soon declared 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.13 PepsiCo was then called upon to pay its guarantee.14 PepsiCo asserted 
two causes of action against Banner: (1) that Banner was CL’s alter ego, and (2) that Banner 
caused PepsiCo’s loss “in whole or material part by the wrongful diversion of Lee Way assets.”15 
In regards to PepsiCo’s alter ego claim, the court stated that “PepsiCo has not shown that this 
harm differs in kind from the harm suffered by any other creditor of CL or Lee Way.”16 
Similarly, PepsiCo’s second claim was also “no more than a claim of generalized harm to the 
estate.”17 Since PepsiCo’s claim was general and PepsiCo was harmed no differently than other 
creditors, it should have been brought by the trustee. 
 However, as an exception to the general rule, the trustee cannot bring claims that are 
individualized to a particular creditor.18 Personal injury, on the other hand, is injury unique to the 
creditor and may be brought by an individual creditor.19 In order to determine whether injury is 
unique to an individual claimant, “a court must look to the injury for which relief is sought and 
consider whether it is peculiar and personal to the claimant or general and common to the 
corporation and creditors.”20 The inquiry is thus deciding whether the debtor’s estate is injured 
(injuring creditors indirectly) as opposed to analyzing whether the actions by creditors are 
common to a number of them.21 The court will thus engage in a factual inquiry and seek to 
                                               
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 692. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 690. It appears that PepsiCo is making a fraudulent transfer claim. The court acknowledges that the claim as 
stated is not sufficient for a valid cause of action. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co, 884 F.2d at 705. 
16 Id. at 704. 
17 Id. at 705. 
18 See Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 170. 
19 Id. 
20 Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1349 (7th Cir. 1987). 
21 See In re Schimmelpennick, 183 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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classify the relief as specific to the individual creditor, or applicable to all creditors by injury to 
the debtor’s estate.    
 Claims alleging that misrepresentations were made to specific creditor(s) (but not all of 
the creditors) are individualized claims that can be brought by those affected creditors. For 
example, in Matter of Educators Group Health Trust, the court determined that specific 
representations were made only to a specific group of creditors, and so they had standing to sue 
without relying on the trustee.22 Educators Group Health Trust (EGHT) was created to provide 
health benefits to teachers.23 In 1988, EGHT filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.24 As a result, the 
participating school districts became creditors of the estate.25 The plaintiffs in this case include 
seven of the two hundred school districts that participated in EGHT.26 They allege fraud, 
conspiracy to commit fraud, negligence, inter alia.27 The court held that these claims were 
particularized injury because “plaintiff school districts allege . . . that the defendants intentionally 
misrepresented to them the financial situation of EGHT.”28 Here, the court italicized the words 
“to them” to emphasize the necessity of individual harm.29 In other words, EGHT, the plaintiffs 
allege, did not make broad misrepresentations to all of the school districts, but did so in their 
negotiations specifically with plaintiff schools.  
II. Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Fraudulent Transfer are General Claims 
A. The Trustee is the Proper Person to Assert a Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
Because They are Generalized Claims 
 
                                               
22 25 F.3d at 1286. 




27 Id. at 1286. 
28 Id. at 1285. 
29 Id. 
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 Claims for breach of fiduciary duties cannot be brought by an individual creditor when 
the debtor files for bankruptcy relief. Claims for breach of fiduciary duties generally do not 
require the application of bankruptcy law and can thus be resolved outside the bankruptcy 
context.30 This is because fiduciary duties owed by directors and officers of a debtor do not 
typically extend to creditors.31 Instead, fiduciary duties to creditors will arise when a debtor 
corporation becomes insolvent.32 When these fiduciary duties arise, “creditors of an insolvent 
corporation are precluded from asserting direct claims against the corporate directors for a 
breach of their fiduciary duties. Instead, creditors may pursue derivative claims on behalf of the 
insolvent corporation.”33 So, fiduciary duties to creditors only arise when a corporation becomes 
insolvent and breach of which would similarly affect all other creditors.34 Naturally, then, when a 
corporation is in bankruptcy, a creditor will individually be unable to claim breach of fiduciary 
duties and must seek relief through the trustee, or through pursuing a derivative claim.  
 
 
B. The Trustee is the Proper Person to Assert a Claim for Fraudulent Transfer Because it is a 
Generalized Claim 
 
 A fraudulent transfer claim cannot be brought by an individual creditor when the debtor 
files for bankruptcy. Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee shall “step 
into the shoes of a creditor for the purpose of asserting causes of action under state fraudulent 
conveyance acts for the benefit of all creditors, not just those who win a race to judgment.”35 As 
such, the Supreme Court has held that creditors cannot maintain an action for fraudulent transfer 
                                               
30 See In re Allied Systems Holdings, Inc., 524 B.R. 598, 606 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
31 See In re Forman Enterprises, Inc., 281 B.R. 600, 610 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002). 
32 See In re Insulforams, Inc., 184 B.R. 694, 703-04 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995). 
33 In re Bruno, 553 B.R. 280, 286 n.39 (W.D. Pa. 2016). 
34 See Id. 
35 In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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because such action is vested in the trustee.36 This is because a fraudulent transfer claim is one 
that would injure the debtor’s estate and indirectly affect all creditors. Thus, a fraudulent transfer 
claim will need to be brought by the trustee, or through pursuing a derivative claim. 
C. A Derivative Claim Allows a Creditor to Pursue Actions Otherwise Belonging to the 
Trustee 
 
 Through derivative standing, a creditor can step into the trustee’s shoes and assert claims 
on behalf of an estate. A creditor can obtain standing to pursue a derivative claim if either (1) the 
trustee consents to the creditor pursuing such action, or (2) the trustee unreasonably refuses to 
bring the creditor’s claims.37 Creditors must seek permission from the bankruptcy court to bring 
a derivative claim.38 Therefore, it is possible to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duties and 
fraudulent transfer through derivative standing if the creditor(s) first seek permission from the 
trustee and the court, or the trustee unreasonably refuses to bring the claim itself and the court 
grants approval to bring the action notwithstanding the trustee’s refusal to bring the action. 
Conclusion 
 Creditors wishing to assert generalized claims against other creditors of a mutual debtor 
must rely on the trustee to represent their interests and accept that they will be bound by the 
trustee’s action, or obtain derivative standing.39 If a creditor can show injury that is unique and 
independent of the debtor’s estate, it is possible for the creditor to assert that claim on its own 
behalf.40 However, determining whether the creditor’s injury is unique requires a factual inquiry 
into the relief sought, which leaves ample discretion to the courts and little guidance in terms of 
predictability. Furthermore, creditors will generally be unable to assert claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty or fraudulent transfer against another creditor when the debtor is in bankruptcy 
                                               
36 See Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1878). 
37 See In re Racing Services, Inc. 540 F.3d 892, 905 (8th Cir. 2008). 
38 Id. at 899. 
39 St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 884 F.2d at 701. 
40 Id. 
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unless the creditor can obtain derivative standing.41 Nonetheless, holding that creditors lack 
standing to pursue generalized claims, such as claims for breach of fiduciary duties or fraudulent 
transfer, is necessary to prevent creditors racing for judgments and thereby reducing the debtor’s 
assets available for equitable distribution.  
 
                                               
41 See In re Bruno, 553 B.R. at 286 n.39; See also Langdon, 98 U.S. 27-28. 
